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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The only difference between the latter situations and the actual facts
of the case is that the date of distribution occurred both after the hus-
band's death and the executor's sale. Brewster held that the decree of
distribution gives no new rights and should not be considered in deter-
mining basis. By concentrating on the status of the plaintiff as executor of
the wife's estate at the time of sale and on the date of distribution, the
majority in Manufacturers Hanover Trust put form before substance. 2
The result reached in Manufacturers Hanover Trust represents a trap
for the unwary. A long period of administration is not unusual, and the
conclusion reached by the majority would, mutatis mutandis, be equally
applicable to a shorter period of administration. The use of a single corpo-
rate executor for sucessive estates is not an unusual practice. The likelihood
of a corporate executor's serving successive estates has in fact, been greatly
increased in North Carolina due to the significant and continuing ex-
pansion of the state's larger banks, which now offer trust services that
were not available in the past. Executors should be aware when admin-
istering successive estates that utmost care should be taken in the choice
of dates for the distribution and sale of estate property.
LANNY B. BRIDGERS
Insurance-Liability of Insurers under the Omnibus Clause to
Protect Emergency Drivers-The North Carolina Situation
The general effect of an omnibus clause in an automobile liability
insurance policy is that one using the automobile with the permission of
the named insured becomes an additional insured under the policy.' Not
only does coverage under the omnibus clause provide the driver with a
right against the insurer for indemnification for liability arising out of
his use of the vehicle,2 but such coverage also guarantees at least minimal
recovery to an innocent third party who suffers personal injury or prop-
" The inequitable result reached by the majority is even more apparent upon
consideration of the estate-tax consequences. The fair market value of the securities
at the date of the husband's death was used to compute the estate tax on his estate.
27 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4354 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as APPLEMAN]; 7 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ &15.5,
.8 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BLASHEIELD].
27 APPLEMAN § 4354; 7 BLASIFIELD § 315.5. The liability of the insurer is
still controlled by the limits of coverage of the policy. 7 APPEMAN § 4371.
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erty damage due to the driver's fault.3 The importance of protection for
the injured third party is clearly evident when it is realized that the
driver may be judgment-proof.
In Whelchel v. Sommer,4 the owner's wife took his car without his
knowledge. While she was driving, the vehicle went into a skid.
The wife, suffering from a heart condition, became hysterical and
allegedly passed out. Unable to drive, she was transferred to another
car to be taken home. At no time did she give anyone permission to
drive the car. However, one of her passengers decided to return the car
to the owner's home because it was feared that the vehicle would be stolen
or vandalized if left unattended in the immediate vicinity. An accident
ensued in which the driver was killed and the appellant in the case was
injured. The appellant, after obtaining a judgment against the decedent's
estate that was unsatisfied, brought an action against the owner's in-
surance company for garnishment under the omnibus clause. Judgment
was rendered for the insurer by the federal trial court on the basis that
the decedent did not have permission to drive the car, and this judgment
was affirmed on appeal.
Traditionally, permission of the named insured has been the key in
bringing the omnibus clause into effect, and litigation involving whether
there is coverage under such a provision is generally "permission-
oriented."" A typical policy may read:
Persons Insured:
(1) the named insured ...
(2) any other person using such automobile with the permission
of the named insured .... 6
There is general agreement today that permission may be expressed or
implied ;7 that is, when express permission cannot be found, the court
I "[S]uit may . . .be brought against the insured by a third person, injured
by the conduct of the automobile, by garnishment or otherwise." 7 APPLEMAN
§4371.
'413 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1969).
'For a discussion of the major issues which "dominate the history of litiga-
tion ... with reference to the omnibus provision," see Note, The Omnibus Clause
and Extension of Coverage by the Court, 45 N.D.L. REv. 505 (1969).
'McLendon, Coverage Disputes: Basis of Defenses in NORTH CAROLINA BAR
ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON LIABILITY INSURANCE LITIGATION inI-1,
111-12 (1968) [hereinafter cited as McLendon] (emphasis added).
77 APIPLEMAN § 4365; 7 BLASHFIELD § 315.10. North Carolina makes this
provision by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (Supp. 1969).
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may look to see if the insured had impliedly consented to the driver's
use of the vehicle. In making this determination, the facts and circum-
stances of each case are considered." However, judicial decisions have
developed certain rules regarding the particular facts and circumstances
that will justify a finding of implied permission. Three factors are gen-
erally required to coexist: (1) a history of frequent past use by the
permittee, (2) knowledge by the named insured of such use, and (3)
acquiescence on the part of the named insured.' If no permission is found,
the court will generally stop its inquiry and hold that the driver is not
an additional insured. On such a finding, the injured party may be
without a satisfactory remedy since the insurer is absolved from liability.
In Whelchel, as permission in the traditional sense could not be
established, the appellant argued that the court should extend "implied
permission" to cover the decedent on the basis of emergency-i.e., that
the court should find a constructive consent in that operation of the
vehicle was under such circumstances that the named insured under the
policy would have granted his permission had he been in a position to do
do. As to "[t] he question of whether an 'emergency' can create implied
permission of the named insured to drive his insured automobile,"' the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized that the issue was
one of first impression under Missouri law" and that very few other courts
had previously considered it.12 Under the dictate of Erie,3 the court
found that the closest analogy to the question before it was the approach
taken by the Missouri courts in cases presenting the traditional issue of
implied permission. Finding that Missouri had adopted a strict position
87 BLASHFIELD § 315.10.
1 Note, The Omnibus Clause and Extension of Coverage by the Court, supra
note 5, at 519. Implied permission may also arise from the relationship of the parties
or from certain conduct on the part of the named insured, but such permission is
not germane to this note. Id. at 518-21.
"o Whelchel v. Sommer, 413 F.2d 521, 526 (8th Cir. 1969).
" The case was in the federal courts on removal from a Missouri court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship. The parties agreed that Missouri law was
controlling. Id. at 524.
"2 Perhaps the most analogous case in which liability for the insurer has been
found is Coons v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 701, 207
N.Y.S.2d 819 (1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 994, 176 N.E.2d 515, 218 N.Y.S.2d 66
(1961). In this case the insured stopped his automobile in the middle of a busy
street and walked away. A passenger attempted to move the vehicle and had an
accident. Though the court mentioned the foreseeable "emergency," the decision
appears to be based on permission implied from the conduct of the insured. See
note 9 supra.
"Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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in that regard, the court felt compelled to hold that state law would not
have recognized implied permission based on emergency. However, the
court added:
. . . [W]e cannot escape the conclusion that a beneficial purpose
would have been served if the Missouri Supreme Court could have
rendered a definitive decision on a question that deeply involves
matters of local law and policy.14
This question of "local law and policy" suggests that Whelchel, though
far removed from the local forum, calls for a searching inquiry as to
what should constitute permission in North Carolina. For the sake of
discussion, let us imagine a clear situation of emergency arising in this
state.'5 Insured, driving alone, stops to pick up a hitchhiker. While stopped,
insured slumps over the wheel unconscious. As no help is immediately
available, the hitchhiker takes the wheel to drive to the hospital. Is the
hitchhiker an additional insured? Under North Carolina case law, the
answer is no. Clearly there has been no express permission.
Where express permission is relied upon it must be of an affirmative
character, directly and distinctly stated, clear and outspoken, and not
merely implied or left to inference.-6
It also appears that there is no implied permission on these facts.
Though not spelling out the elements mentioned earlier,' 7 North Carolina
has followed the traditional approach.
S.. [I]mplied permission involves an inference arising from a course
of conduct or relationship between the parties, in which there is
mutual acquiescence or lack of objection under circumstances sig-
nifying consent.'
8
14413 F.2d at 527.
" As the court in Whelchel refused to accept appellant's argument regarding
emergency, it was unnecessary for it to determine if the facts of the case actually
constituted such an emergency that the omnibus clause would be brought into effect.
A significant difficulty in expanding implied permission to cover the "emergency
operator" is the determination of what circumstances in fact constitute an emer-
gency. Inquiring of the trier of fact whether a reasonable man would have granted
his permission if he had known of the circumstances and had been in a position to
consent may provide a solution.
Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 257 N.C. 381, 384, 126
S.E.2d 161, 164 (1962).
' See text preceding note 9 supra.
18 Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 257 N.C. 381, 384, 126
S.E.2d 161, 164-65 (1962).
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Should an accident occur under circumstances similar to those in our
hypothetical fact-situation, the result might be to leave injured third
persons without redress. Is such an outcome warranted on the sole
grounds that the insured was unable to expressly consent and that, since
the parties were strangers, no "course of conduct" can be established?
The expressed public policy of the state would decry such a result.
The primary purpose of the law requiring compulsory insurance is
to furnish at least partial compensation to innocent victims who have
suffered injury and damage as a result of the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle upon the public highway.19
Yet, for "claims or causes of action" arising before July 6, 1967,20 it is
apparent that there would be no liability for the insurer.
In 1967, North Carolina General Statutes, section 20-279.21 was
amended to read:
(b) Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
(2) Shall insure the person named therein and any other person,
as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor ve-
hicles with the express or implied permission of such
named insured, or any other persons in lawful posses-
Sion .... 21
The addition of the italicized language would appear to provide coverage
to the hitchhiker in our hypothetical situation as the use of the conjunc-
tion "or" seems to indicate that "lawful possession" is something different
from "using . . . with . . . express or implied permission." However,
this interpretation ultimately depends upon a similar construction of the
words "lawful possession" by the North Carolina courts, and to this date
no litigation involving the issue has been before the supreme court or
the court of appeals. 2
19Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hale, 270 N.C. 195, 200, 154 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1967).
Ch. 1162, §4, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1795 provides: "[N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b) (2) (amendment ratified July 6, 1967)] shall be in full force and effect
from and after its ratification, but shall not affect any claims or causes of action
arising before ratification."
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added). Since
coverage under the omnibus clause of "persons in lawful possession" of the named
insured's vehicle is based upon the public policy of providing minimum protection
for third persons, the courts might well limit the insurer's liability under the clause
to the statutory minimums in the absence of an express provision to the contrary
in the insurance policy.
2 Though this language was included in an earlier statute (Ch. 1006, § 4(2) (b),
[Vol. 48
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The preamble to the session law through which this statutory addition
was enacted" also appears to support the conclusion that it was intended
to expand the scope of the omnibus clause beyond the traditional coverage
of drivers with the "permission" of the named insured.
WHEREAS, many innocent and blameless citizens who are vic-
tims of serious personal injuries and property loss are unable to re-
ceive any compensation whatsoever because of difficulty of proof under
the terms of liability insurance policies, and it is difficult and often
impossible for injured parties and operators to prove that one law-
fully in possession of a vehicle had the express or implied permission
of the owner to drive on the very trip and occasion of the collision;
and
WHEREAS, liability coverage under the laws of North Carolina
is provided for an operator of a vehicle who has the "express or implied
permission" of the titled owner but does not extend to persons other-
wise lawfully in possession of vehicles .... 24
Section two of the same session law reads: "It shall be a defense to
any action that the operator of a motor vehicle was not in lawful posses-
sion on the occasion complained of."'25 Mr. L. P. McLendon, Jr., a
member of the Senate Insurance Committee when the law was con-
sidered and passed, has pointed out that the effect of the second section
is to shift the burden of proof to the insurer to show that the operator
was not in lawful possession.26 Quaere whether the insurer can meet
this burden by simply showing that the operator had neither the express
nor the implied permission of the insured. If so, it would appear that
the sole effect of the statutory addition is to ease the plaintiff's "difficulty
of proof" by shifting the burden on the issue of permission and that, in
fact, coverage under the omnibus clause is not extended beyond the
operator's having permission.
Since such a construction is possible, it is necessary for us to
consider where the "emergency operator" and the person that he injures
stand if they must fall back upon actual permission, express or implied.
[1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1414 (repealed 1953)), the cases indicate that there has been
no judicial determination of the meaning of "lawful possession."
Ch. 1162, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1794.
"Id. at 1795 (emphasis added).
2 cId.
"8 McLendon at 111-13.
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A consideration of the circumstances that gave rise to the 1967 amend-
ment may be helpful to the litigant. Mr. McLendon has attributed the
legislation to confusion existing from court decisions dealing with the
omnibus clause.2 7 This confusion arose in an attempt by the supreme
court to settle on one of three approaches taken by other jurisdictions
in interpreting such clauses. Relying on Hawley v. Indemnity Insurance
Co. of North America,28 Mr. McLendon has summarized the three
approaches as follows:
(1) Strict Rule- . . . [A]ny deviation from the time, place or pur-
pose specified by the person granting permission is sufficient to take
the permittee outside the coverage of the omnibus clause.
(2) Moderate Rule-... [A] material deviation from the permission
granted constitutes a use without permission, but a slight deviation is
not sufficient to exclude the permittee from coverage.
(3) Liberal Rule- . . [I]f the permittee has permission to use the
auto in the first instance, any subsequent use while it remains in his
possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the bailment, is a permissive use within the terms of the clause.20
In Hawley, the supreme court derived a legislative intention to con-
fine construction of omnibus clauses at least to the moderate rule.30 The
rationale was that since the Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act
of 194731 had extended coverage to one "using or responsible for the use
of the motor vehicle with the permission, expressed or implied, of the
named insured, or any other person in lawful possession,' ' 2 the deletion
in 1953 of the italicized phrases indicated a legislative desire to narrow
the statute. Mr. McLendon has criticized this interpretation and has
pointed out that the legislature modeled the language of the 1953 enact-
ment3 4 deleting the phrase in question on a provision in the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of 1952,", which has been held
2 7 
Id.
28257 N.C. 381, 126 S.E.2d 161 (1962), ioted in Note, Automobile Insurance-
Permissive User Under the Omnibus Clause, 41 N.C.L. REV. 232 (1963). Mr.
McLendon also relied upon this case note.
29 McLendon at 111-14.
10257 N.C. at 387, 126 S.E.2d at 167.
Ch. 1006, §§ 1-59, [1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1412-32 (repealed 1953).
Id. § 4(2) (b) at 1414 (emphasis added).
88 Ch. 1300, § 21(b) (2), [1953] N.C. Sess. L. 1271.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (1965), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§20-279.21(b) (2) (Supp. 1969).
" The pertinent provision in uniform legislation today can be found in NATIONAL
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to encompass the liberal rule in other jurisdictions 6 "Importantly," he
has stated, "the Court noted that the omnibus clause as contained in the
[1947 act] was broad enough to embrace the liberal rule.' 'aT Though
Mr. McLendon did not say that the purpose of reinsertion of the phrase
"in lawful possession" by the 1967 General Assembly was to enact the
liberal rule, the quotation above would indicate his opinion that there was
intent by the legislature to allow the courts to adopt it.
Significant in this legislative history is that the rules in question as
well as the supreme court's opinion in Hawley are not concerned with
what constitutes initial permission. Rather the focus is on the scope of
such permission and the consequences for deviation from it3s Therefore,
any attempt to determine specific legislative intent to either expand or
restrict what constitutes initial permission would be futile, for it is
implicit that this question was not considered by the legislature. How-
ever, continuing to be aware that "[a] compulsory motor vehicle in-
surance act is a remedial statute and will be liberally construed so that
the beneficial purpose intended by its enactment . . .may be accom-
plished,""0 the courts should realize that the specific attempt to liberalize
the applicability of the statute in those cases involving a permissive user
is some indication of the feeling of the legislature about application of
the statute generally. As the 1967 amendment clearly provides the
opportunity for adoption of the liberal rule in North Carolina as to the
scope of permission once granted, it appears permissible for the courts
to similarly liberalize the view of what constitutes initial permission so
that the emergency operator will be covered by insurance and persons or
property injured by his driving will be afforded some protection.40 Even
under the traditional interpretation of implied permission, the supreme
court has recognized that "the purpose of the use . . . [has] bearing on
COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, UNIFORM VEHICLE
CODE & MODEL TRAFFIC ORDINANCE § 7-324(b) (2) (rev. ed. 1968).
" McLendon at 111-13.
87 Id.
8 For a discussion of problems regarding the scope of permission in North
Carolina see Note, Autonmbile Insumrance-Permissive User Under the Omnibus
Clause, 41 N.C.L. REv. 232 (1963).
"' Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 535, 155 S.E.2d 128,
130-31 (1967).
"0 It is difficult for this writer to comprehend why the emergency operator
(who is perhaps performing a service for the insured and who may possibly have
the insured in the automobile at the time of the accident) should not be provided
coverage if coverage is provided to one who has initial permission regardless of
the extent of his later deviation. Liberal Ride in text at note 29 supra.
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the critical question of the owner's implied permission for the actual
use."
41
Whether the courts interpret "lawful possession" to cover the emer-
gency operator or whether he is found to have "permission" because of
the existing emergency, it is evident that coverage must be provided under
the statute if more than lip service is paid to the public policy underlying
compulsory liability insurance in North Carolina. Arguably, the more
desirable approach is to give "lawful possession" a meaning independent
of permission, for the former appears to describe the emergency situation
more accurately. Indeed, "lawful possession" can even be extended
beyond the emergency situation so that anyone other than a thief becomes
an insured. Such a far-reaching interpretation would still fall short of the
ultimate remedial goal of providing partial redress to every innocent
victim of a negligent driver.
4 2
JAMES LEE DAVIS
Labor Law-Duty to Bargain in Good Faith-Boulwarism
Within the Totality-of-Circumstances Rule
In 1947, following a series of setbacks in negotiations with the three
major unions representing its employees,' General Electric introduced a
new approach into its technique of collective bargaining. This approach,
labelled "Boulwarism" after its supposed progenitor,2 was designed to
instill in the employees of GE the idea that the company, without prodding
by the representatives of the employees, would do what was "right" and
would give each employee the benefits to which he was entitled, but no
more.3 The implementation of Boulwarism was two-pronged. First, by
means of extensive investigation into the various economic factors in-
,1 Bailey v. General Ins. Co. of America, 265 N.C. 675, 678, 144 S.E.2d 898,
900 (1965).
4' See text preceding notes 19 & 24 supra.
' Note, Labor Law: General Electric's "Overall Approach" to Bargaining
Held a Violation of Good Faith, 1965 DuKE L.J. 661 n.1. See Cooper, Boul-
warisin and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 20 RUTGERS L. Ruv. 653, 662-63
& n.35 (1966).
'Lemuel R. Boulware, then vice-president of GE, designed the new technique
in the late 1940's. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS
LAw 718 (4th ed. 1968). The most detailed history of Boulwarism is contained
in H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARISM (1964).
'Note, Labor Law--Collective Bargaining-General Electric's Fir~n Offer Ap-
proach Held Bad Faith, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 798 (1965). GE developed an almost
paternalistic attitude toward its employees. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 660.
[Vol. 48
